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NOTES AND COMMENTS
free of the remainder. In a somewhat similar case, a provision in
a will required the erection of a monument, and the upkeep of the
testator's grave. The provision relating to the upkeep of the grave
was held void, but the part of the trust relating to the erection of
the monument was upheld. 1
Conversely, if to enforce the other provisions would so distort
the disposition as to produce a result which the settlor would never
have intended, the whole trust will fail.32
Stanley Jones.
RESULTING TRUSTS-AN EXCEPTION TO THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
THE Texas Trust Act,1 enacted in 1943, declares that all oral
trusts "in relation to or consisting of real property" are
unenforceable.2 Resulting and constructive trusts are expressly
excluded from its operation.3 Today, however, express, oral trusts
in land are being enforced by the courts, these trusts having been
created prior to the passage of the Trust Act, and are thus un-
affected by it.' Of concern here is the resulting trust, and it will
now be considered in relation to parol and constructive trusts, as
exemplified by recent Texas cases.
31 Mcllvain v. Hockaday, 36 Civ. App. 1. 81 S. W. 54 (1904) writ of error refused.
32 Brooker v. Brooker, 130 Tem. 27, 106 S. W. (2d) 247 (1937) ; Anderson v. Mene-
fee, 174 S. W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) writ of error refused.
1 TE. REV. Cxv. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) Art. 7425b.
2 TEx. Rrv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) Art. 7425b-7, "An express trust may
be created by one of the following means or methods: ... Provided, however, that a
trust in relation to or consisting of real property shall be invalid, unless created, estab-
lished, or declared by a written instrument...."
3 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1943) Art. 7425b-2, " 'Trust' for the purpose
of this act means an express trust only, and does not include resulting or constructive
trusts....
4 Binford v. Snyder, 144 Tex. 134, 189 S. W. (2d) 471 (1945).
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The Texas Statute of Frauds' and the Statute of Conveyances,'
the counterparts of the English Statute of Frauds' had omitted
Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the English statute. The omitted sections
are now generally included in the Texas Trust Act. Early Texas
cases refused to extend the Statute of Conveyances' to cover
equitable interests and allowed parol trusts, but enforced them
only where the oral trust agreement was contemporaneous with a
written conveyance. Where the agreement was made after the con-
veyance, it was condemned by the statute.' The effect of the sec-
tions of the Trust Act under discussion is to deny validity to
express, oral trusts, except those arising prior to 1943, unless a
resulting or constructive trust can be found.
A resulting trust rests upon what is presumed to be the actual,
though sometimes unexpressed, intention of the parties, and is
founded upon the equitable principle that the beneficial interest
follows the consideration."
The type of resulting trust to be discussed is exemplified by the
following situation: A conveys land to B, the consideration for
which was paid by C, and variations of this." Here B holds title
as trustee under a resulting trust for C, unless certain exceptions
prevail, mainly those arising from a contrary intent by C.'2 This
example must be distinguished from a case where A conveys to B
with instruction to hold in trust for C, or where A conveys to B
5 TEx. Rsx. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 3995.
6 Tm REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1288.
7 29 Charles 11, Chapter 3 (1676).
s TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1288, "No estate of inheritance or free-
hold, or for a term of more than one year, in lands and tenements, shall be conveyed
from one to another, unless the conveyance be declared by an instrument in writing,
subscribed and delivered by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto
authorized by writing."
9 James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512 (1851); Meade v. Randolph, 8 Tex 191 (1852);
Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 107 S. W. 528 (1908).
I0 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, j 440 (1935); 54 AM. JtJR. 22. 8 5 (1936) ; 54 Am. JuiL
147, 188 (1936).
11 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, 1 440 (1935).
12 Id, § 441, 442, 444.
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with instruction to hold in trust for A." The latter transactions, if
declared in writing, are enforceable express trusts, but if declared
orally, they are parol trusts and as such are expressly declared
unenforceable by the Trust Act, unless elements are present from
which a constructive trust may be found." '
Two recent cases have enforced parol, express trusts that were
made prior to the Texas Trust Act, but in either case the trust
could have been enforced as a resulting trust to the amount con-
tributed."5 In Haigh v. Calhoun6 A conveyed land to B, the con-
sideration being paid equally by B, C, and D. Heirs of B, the
record title holder, sued in trespass to try title for the entire tract.
Evidence showed that B, at the origin of the transaction and at all
times subsequent, had claimed only a one-third beneficial interest.
The Court indicated that a resulting trust might have been found,
but affirmed the decision on the ground of an express, oral trust.
In the other case, Scott v. Cliett,'7 A conveyed land to B. Both
B and C paid the consideration. After the death of B, C sued in
two alternative counts for title to the entire tract. The first count
alleged a parol trust, the understanding being that C would con-
tribute to the purchase price and would take care of B during his
life, and that be would hold the entire tract in trust for C. The
second count alleged that B had made a verbal gift of the land to
C in consideration of C paying part of the purchase price, going
into possession, and providing a home for B during his life. The
Court of Appeals sustained a decision of the trial court, holding
that the evidence was sufficient to support either an oral trust or
a gift.
It is to be borne in mind that in both the Haigh and Scott cases
the purchase of the land was made several years before 1943. The
13 Note, 35 A. L R. 281 (1925).
14 RESTATEMENT, TnuSTS, 1 44 (1935); 54 Am. JuR. 178, § 233 (1936); 1 ScoTn.
TRUSTs 253, 1 44.2 (1939).
is RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, § 454 (1935).
i' 215 S. W. (2d) 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
Vt 213 S. W. (2d) 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
1949]
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court seems to be correct in each case in finding a parol trust. If
either transaction had occurred after 1943, probably each court
would have ruled for the same parties on the basis of a resulting
trust to the extent of the money contributed.
However, in the Scott case both B and C contributed to the con-
sideration. C was not suing just for her pro rata share of the land,
but for the entire tract. No difficulty would be encountered in
finding a resulting trust for C to the amount contributed, but a
different problem is encountered in regard to the portion that she
did not pay. This would have to be sustained as a gift, if occurring
after 1943, or not at all, for this is a transaction in which B
declares himself trustee for C, an example of an express trust
which is unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds."8 One other pos-
sible solution is that B would get a life estate in the land and C
would get the remainder, this being the value of the consideration
contributed by each, but this occurs only where B and C agreed
at the time of purchase that such would result. 9
It is essential to the existence of a resulting trust that A pay the
consideration or that B make a loan to A at the time of the pur-
chase."0 In Morrison v. Farmer2' A was owner of a house. B orally
agreed to buy a lot, move, install, and re-condition the house, and
when the work was completed A was to pay B. This was done, but
after completion a disagreement arose in regard to the price owed.
A sued to enforce an oral contract or trust. The trial court found
for A, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed on the theory that
a resulting trust arose. The judgment was reversed by the Supreme
Court on the basis that there was no resulting trust, and that
neither an oral contract for the sale of land nor an express, oral
trust was enforceable. The court said:
is RurA.ITvENT, Tiusrs, § 440 (1935).
19 Reyes v. Boyd. 140 Cal. App. 167, 34 P (2d) 1058 (1934).
20 RsTAT5mENT, Tnusu, §§ 440, 451.
21 Tex., 213 S. W. (2d) 813 (1948).
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"A resulting trust arises by operation of law when title is conveyed
to one person but the purchase price is paid by another. The parties are
presumed to have intended that the grantee hold title to the use of him
who paid the purchase price and whom equity deems to be the true
owner. The trust arises out of the transaction and must arise at the
time when the title passes.
' ' 22
Possibly the court could have found a resulting trust on the
theory of a loan from B to A, but there was no evidence of intent
to loan when B purchased the lot, and the decision seems correct.
Confusion exists in situations where A gives money to B and B
buys land from C. Where B buys and takes title in his own name
with the consent of A, a resulting trust arises, but if A does not
consent to the purchase, or does not consent that the property pur-
chased should be recorded in B's name, the majority rule is that a
constructive trust arises, not a resulting trust.
2 3
In the recent case of Berry v. Rhine,24 A gave money to B with
intention that B buy property for A. B took title in her name with-
out A's consent. A sued to impress a resulting trust and received
judgment on that theory. The court seemed to consider the situa-
tion to be one where A had consented to the taking of title in B's
name, which was not the case. B's act was done in denial of A's
rights, and it is believed that a constructive, not a resulting, trust
should have been found. Actually, however, the theory adopted
was immaterial since th result would be the same.
In some transactions it is difficult to differentiate between re-
sulting and constructive trusts. The Court of Civil Appeals cor-
rectly recognized a distinction in larret v. HaIfl 6 where A desired
to buy land from B. C agreed to lend the purchase price to A, but
at the time of sale C took title in himself. A took possession and
n -Tex.., ._ 213 S. W. (2d) 813, 815 (1948).
2$ Mills v. Gray, -Tex.-, 210 S. W. (2d) 985 (1948); First State Bank v.
Zetesky, 262 S. W. 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) writ of error refused; Miller v. Hime-
baugh, 153 S. W. 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); RESTATF.MENT, TRUSTS, J 440 (1935);
42 TEx. JUi. 661. § 54 (1933); Note, 43 A. L R. 1417, (1926).
24 205 S. W. (2d) 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
25 207 S. W. (2d) 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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used it as his own. Later C tried to collect rent from A, and A
sued to establish a trust. The court said that if C had, at the time
of taking title, intended to perform his promise, a resulting trust
would have arisen.2" The court did not have to apply this doctrine,
however, since a breach of confidential relations was found, and
a constructive trust was imposed.
A resulting trust must be created, if at all, at the very time a
deed is taken and the legal title vested in the grantee.2" The Court
of Civil Appeals applied this rule in Bunnell v Bunnell.2" A
bought land, assumed a prior mortgage, and executed a note for
$1,936.00 for the balance of the purchase price, the last amount
to be paid from money received from the sale of other land owned
by A, B, and C as tenants-in-common. C, mother of A and B, owned
one-half of this land, and A and B owned one-fourth each. C died,
named B as devisee, and B sued to impress a resulting trust upon
three-fourths of the land bought by A, contending that it was
agreed at the time of the purchase of the second tract that the
parties would own it in the same proportion that they owned the
first tract.
The jury found that the proceeds of the sale of the first tract were
received by A, and that C gave her share to A, making his interest
three-fourths of the total, which was more than enough to cover the
$1,936.00 note. They further found that there was no agreement
that the parties had intended to own the same proportion of the
second tract of land that they did in the first. The Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed a judgment of the trial court for A, saying that a
subsequent agreement that B was to share in the second tract of
land would not impress a resulting trust upon A, and that B had
not sufficiently traced her money into the second tract, if any, for
the court to determine the trust upon a equitable pro tanto basis.
28 RESTATEMENT, Tauvss, § 448 (1935) ; Note, 43 A. L 1- 1423 (1926).
27 Morrison v. Farmer, -Te., 213 S. W. (2d) 813 (1948).
28 217 S. W. (2d) 78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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The Court of Civil Appeals in Davis v. Pearce"' found that a
resulting trust did not exist in a situation where A conveyed prop-
erty to B, the purchase price being paid by C, applying an excep-
tion to the general rule which allows a resulting trust under such
facts. At the time of the purchase there was no agreement or
intention that B would convey the property to C, when C de-
manded; in fact the original intention was that B should have the
beneficial interest. The court recognized the general rule, but said
that the resulting trust may be rebutted by showing that it was the
intention of C at the time of the conveyance that B was to have the
beneficial interest. This is a well accepted exception to the rule
imposing a resulting trust where the grantee does not pay the
consideration.30
Implied trusts at law have been given increased importance by
passage of the Texas Trust Act. Cases where evidence pointed to a
resulting trust, but were enforced by the courts as express, oral
trusts, as in the Haigh and Scott cases, will now be enforced as re-
sulting trusts, or not at all. The result, it is believed, will be bene-
ficial. The cases will be fewer, and of these, a larger percentage
will be meritorious.
Hoyt D. Howard.
29 205 S. W. (2d) 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
10RsTATKzIT., Tausim, § 441 (1935).
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